<underfire> Atheism and Peace
Melani McAlister
mmc at gwu.edu
Tue Nov 28 11:56:23 EST 2006
I can't really do justice to John Woodward's nuanced post, but I'll state briefly that I think we have come to the heart of a key issue: what do we mean, what does anyone mean, when they talk about a "secular public sphere"? Habermas's notion of "the unforced force of the superior argument" -- beautiful in its elegance -- presumes that we have a shared notion of what constitutes rational debate, and that this rationality can and should be free of "belief" in its various forms.
I think this is an important gesture, a performative statement, but that (as many critics of Habermas have pointed out) it makes an assumption that is manifestly not the case: that there is, in fact, this kind of neutral rationality, not shaped by presumption, emotion, belief. To point this toward the topic at hand: any "rational" debate about the "war on terrorism" begins with all sorts of presumptions, values ... beliefs, from the nature of American power to emotionally charged definitions of terrorism the possibility and nature of peace (to speak to Retort's opening salvo). This doesn't mean that such conversations are not possible and necessary; it does mean that the notion all sorts of people coming to the table without "being locked in one ideological framework" (as John put it) is, at best, a useful fiction.
Talal Asad's challenge to this model is even more fundamental: the division between secular and sacred, he says, is a Christian notion, and the imposition of that model is a Christian-derived logic. I was hoping to wait to write about this when I had his book, _Formations of the Secular_, with me, but I won't be able to get it before I leave the country. Fundamentally, his argument is that, in positing the public sphere (or secularism) as normative, we often ask religious people to put aside their most deeply held beliefs, to put up for negotiation things that, in their view, cannot be negotiated. Public and private is a false dichotomy, if it demands that we keep "private" the beliefs that animate us, and which require public action. If one believes, to take an entirely made-up example, that the gods will keep from heaven those who fail to protect the wood owl from extinction, then this has everything to do with public policy: if one is talking about protecting an area from
being hunted, say, it isn't really a matter up for debate; it doesn't matter if people need jobs as guides for hunters, or if the wood owl is good eating, or whatever. This is a matter of ultimate moral importance; it isn't a matter of pragmatism.
I don't really have an answer to Asad's quite compelling arguments on this, and I'm not entirely convinced by his own models, but I do think that non-religious people have to think through these categories and arguments in a post-Habermasian fashion. We may need to think about the models for constructing moral communities that are not based on abstracted notions of rationality, but that still maintain some form of post-humanist humanism, one that has rituals and communal practices and songs. (The memorialization of the civil rights movement in the United States has some beginnings of that, though it is also a deeply compromised politics as well.)
I apologize that I have to offer this and then essentially disappear from the conversation. I'm leaving soon on a research trip to an area where I won't have any email access. I'll look forward to catching up on the posts when I return, but the "conference" will be over then.
Regards,
Melani McAlister
Associate Professor of American Studies
and International Affairs
George Washington Univ.
mmc at gwu.edu
Mailing address: Office location:
2108 G. St. NW 609 22nd St. NW
Washington, DC 20052 Room 203
Main office: 202-994-6070 Direct: 994-6073
fax: 202-994-8651
----- Original Message -----
From: John Arrington Woodward <jaw0871 at fsu.edu>
Date: Thursday, November 23, 2006 4:46 am
Subject: Re: <underfire> Atheism and Peace
To: underfire at underfire.eyebeam.org
> All,
>
> I am glad this discussion of 'Atheism and Peace' (the sub discussion
> of
> 'Evangelical Internationalism') has taken a turn towards the
> analytical
> and away from the rather superficial comparison of religious v.
> secular
> Weltanschauungen. I would only like to work off of the list of three
> discussions so well outlined by Melani in her last post: "1) what does
>
> it mean to be an atheist? Is atheism a type of faith?
>
> "2) what does it mean to be religious? Does it require a belief in
> God?
> Does it have an inherent political content?
>
> "3) what is the distinction, analytically, between secular and religious?"
>
> Firstly, Melani does excellent work in turning this discussion towards
>
> the analytical and back to its basic political roots by parsing out
> the
> different micro-discussions that are taking place under this one
> rubric--for which, I think, we are all grateful. I must, however, take
>
> issue with her interpretation of the first of these issues.
> Afterwards,
> I will appoach the second issue (to which Melani wrote first) and
> finally very briefly the last (in what I hope will not be an
> inordinately long post). 1) Melani McAlister interprets the discussion
>
> over atheism and faith as being about "whether atheism is better than
>
> belief in god." I think (and please correct me if I am wrong), this is
>
> in an attempt to find the discursive roots of the argument somewhere
> in
> her original posts about the efficacy of International Evangelism on
> the political and social worldstage. However, I think her
> interpretation is a bit hasty. I am not convinced that it is a
> question
> of 'belief' as an aspect of the lifeworld, but rather the political /
>
> social efficacy of religious 'belief' as opposed to atheistic
> 'non-belief.' I think what Michael Goldhaber and others have been
> trying to communicate is the sort of age-old concept of 'bracketing
> off' religious beliefs from political reasoning when entering the
> public sphere. That is not to say that religious people cannot still
> believe in 'God' (or what have you) while carrying on a rational
> discussion, but that this belief should not be used 'analytically' so
>
> to speak. This argument goes towards founding a basic structural
> separation between the religious and the secular not only in society
> but in reasoning itself, so that it can be reflected in society. As
> long as these political ideals meet in the impermanent ground of
> agreement, then most are happy to let deeper structural issues slide.
>
> The problem arises in the face of those who feel a certain right to
> express religious belief at the expense of 'rationality' in a manner
> that is contrary to the 'liberal subjects' political / social
> position.
> As to the distinction between atheistic 'non-belief' and religious
> 'belief', the topic that Melani does not address directly, there is
> also a structural difference that applies to this situation. The
> atheist non-belief is only applicable in these situations of coming to
>
> agreements. In that it is analytical, subject to rational debate, and
>
> not limited to a particular ideological framework. This is an ideal
> personage (Platonically speaking) the shadow of which one comes across
>
> far too inoften. As long as the parties of the discussion are not
> locked into one particular ideological framework, then they represent
>
> the idealized concept of the 'atheist.' This is the root, really, of
> the 'atheistic' persepective in political debate. This leads me to the
>
> latter part of 2): Belief in god is far too limited a concept (or
> expansive) to parse in this manner. Rather, and in order to bring it
> down to an analytical level, we have to question whether this very
> belief is used analytically, as a basis for or limit to a reasoned
> argument. In other words, the belief or non-belief is not the issue;
> rather, whether or not this belief or non-belief comes into play in
> making political / social decisions or limiting a coming-to-terms
> within a socio-political framework. The qualifying 'in God' is what is
>
> unnecessary, for the issue is 'belief' in general. Rationalism does
> not
> 'believe' in anything other than concepts that are, as Melani points
> out, "subject to revision." This division works on a limited scale, of
>
> course, but when the question becomes should we go to war or not, then
>
> the discussion hinges on 'beliefs' and 'morality' to an inordinate
> scale. Rationalism would suggest that war is not only proper and
> needed, but *needs* to be against the weaker opponent in order to
> teach
> lessons to the stronger ones (Machiavelli). Religion can find reasons
>
> for going to war as well (St. Augustine's argument in 'City of God'
> for
> example). But, because the ideological structure of religion is
> command
> oriented (God says to do this...), the question of revision is limited
>
> (within a specific religious community) by this inherently irrational
>
> structure. Melani's pragmatic approach suggests that the religious
> nature of a political ideology is consequential to the coming to an
> agreement with others that this ideology allows. I completely agree
> with her basic thesis (or what I assume is her basic thesis) that the
>
> alientation of religious beliefs (and consequentially the believers
> themselves) from the political realm is fundamentally unsound from a
> political perspective and misconstrues certain social goods undertaken
>
> by religious communities. However, the believers need to understand
> that belief in something in and of itself is not a basis for political
>
> or social discussion in a modern, rational lifeworld. It is also
> necessary to recall that many 'good deeds' undertaken by religious
> communities are oriented towards a certain religious-political economy
>
> rather than the betterment of the world social order. Which brings me
>
> to a brief statement on secularism and the religious. An analytical
> distinction between secular and religious can only be based above
> lived-experience, intersubjective exchange--i.e. as a structural
> condition for this lived-experience. It can only be a forced
> distinction, as well, with clearly demarcated borders. "Give up all
> [belief], ye who enter here..." should be placed above the door.
> Otherwise, the inclination is to rely on preconcieved notions (both
> secular and religious) and that is inherently dangerous. Sincerely,
> John
>
>
> Quoting Melani McAlister <mmc at gwu.edu>:
>
> >
> > I’m responding here to Christopher Young’s comments, plus some of
> > the general debates on religion, secular, atheism, etc.
> >
> > from Christopher:
> > "Second, I am hoping that Melani can offer some thoughts
> > around her statement "aren't we invited to do -many- things, from
> > fighting wars to cleaning up the environment, "for the sake of our
> > children."
> > I am a bit concerned with this statement, as it implies that we
> > (Evangelicals) are obligated by some theological rule to fight in
> > wars....hmmm, I do not get a sense this is really the case- if one
> > was to take a biblical standpoint. "
> >
> >
> > I meant to argue something a bit different here. I was responding to
>
> > Michael Goldhaber’s comments that atheists are less likely to go to
>
> > war than religious people. My point was that “we” – not
> > Evangelicals, but all of us – are hailed by ideologies that invite
> > us to strong action. These ideologies are often secular in their
> > language or concerns; for example, we are called to do various
> things
> > “for the sake of our children,” or “for the future of the
> > planet.” The political content of this commitment to the future may
>
> > be variable: it might be to save the environment, or to support the
>
> > “war on terror” so that our children are not endangered, or to
> > oppose nuclear weapons, or to fight the Soviets to prevent the
> spread
> > of communism. Similarly, belief in God is evoked across the
> political
> > spectrum, from pro- to anti-war, from pro- to anti-environmentalism.
> >
> > I am personally an atheist (of which type, I’ll comment below), but
>
> > I’m a bit shocked by the presumptions here that religious people
> > who believe in God are more pro-war, more easily manipulated, etc.
> Do
> > you really mean that? I think my religious friends are wrong on the
>
> > question of God, but I can’t –imagine- arguing that pacifist
> > Mennonite evangelicals, Sufi Muslims, liberal Jews, anti-Zionist
> > orthodox Jews, liberation theology Catholics, or anti-war
> > evangelicals etc. and etc. are, deep in their hearts, politically
> > retrograde (not to mention, apparently, more likely to have
> children,
> > despite a certain monastic tradition one might want to account for).
>
> > And meanwhile, what about the lovely non-believers who in fact run
> > the United States (do you –really- think Dick Cheney’s faith is
> > the issue?), and who ran the Soviet Union, and who supported Saddam
>
> > Hussein? They are what? Above ideology? Animated only by material
> > interests?
> >
> > I think that, in these various related strands, we might be having
> > (at least) three conversations. To simplify (sometimes brutally):
> >
> > 1) What does it mean to be an atheist? Is atheism a type of faith?
> >
> > 2) What does it mean to be religious? Does it require a belief in
> > God? Does it have an inherent political content?
> >
> > 3) What is the distinction, analytically, between secular and religious?
> >
> > I just spoke to the second of these. I’ll make a comments on 1).
> > (There is a lot more to be said on 3), too, but one has to have life
>
> > outside of email…)
> >
> > The stakes in question 1) seem to be, basically, whether atheism is
>
> > better than belief in god. As several people have said, it’s
> > impossible to prove a negative, so you can’t prove there is no god,
>
> > and almost every religious person I know would agree that you can’t
>
> > prove there –is- one, at least not in the terms that would count as
>
> > proof to non-believers. Believers might cite their own experiences
> as
> > proof, but this isn’t a rationalist sort of proof. So belief in god
>
> > does require faith – the acceptance of a particular explanation for
>
> > whatever experience is at hand. (I prayed and I experienced God’s
> > love. One explanation: there is a god; another explanation: prayer
>
> > produces nice brain waves, as does mediation on a flame.)
> >
> > But neither belief nor non-belief has any given political effect. If
>
> > we want to argue about the basis of our beliefs in the nature of the
>
> > universe and the presence or lack thereof of God, then that’s
> > great. If we want to argue about whether we need to go to war in
> > Iraq, then let’s do that. If someone tells me they oppose war in
> > Iraq because God calls us to turn the other cheek, I’m going to
> > have to disagree with their rationale. But I’m happy to have them
> > at my anti-war meeting, and I’m not going to argue theology with
> > them -- unless we all go out to dinner and decide to do so.
> >
> > People who don’t believe in god –mostly- hold that conviction on
> > rationalist grounds; that is, given the lack of evidence in favor of
>
> > god, and given a commitment to (some version of) empiricism, we are
>
> > not convinced. (There are people who are non-believers based on
> their
> > experience; that is, they feel bereft by a personal loss and believe
>
> > this proves there is no God, but I don’t consider these to be
> > morally serious persons: you believed in God when millions of people
>
> > were dying of hunger and war, but not when your wife was killed in a
>
> > car accident?)
> >
> > I don’t believe in God, with a capital G, for the same reason I
> > don’t believe in the Greek gods or in the presence of aliens.
> > It’s not that I could not, under any circumstances, be convinced.
> > If the aliens show up, I’m going to be pretty damn shocked, but I
> > will believe those things which are observable, repeatable (in other
>
> > words, I’m not the only one who sees them; if I were, other
> > explanations will have to be pursued: like that I’m crazy), and
> > possible to study, even if not to fully understand.
> >
> > There are multiple and valuable critiques of Enlightenment
> > rationalism and its assumptions, as well as its products. I accept
> > many of those critiques, including that this rationalism requires
> and
> > operates from certain assumptions and premises, including the
> > scientific method itself, which is a myth of pure process, but which
>
> > in fact requires theories of how the world is ordered in order to
> > proceed. But the assumptions and models themselves are subject to
> > revision -- Kuhn's paradigm shifts. And we all depend on this model
>
> > of rationalism and its dependability SO frequently, from studies of
>
> > how disease operates to making planes fly, it simply doesn't make
> > sense to me to dismiss it when it comes to the question of God. For
>
> > that reason, and others, I don’t think it makes sense at all to
> > call atheism or rationalism a faith or a religion. (This is why
> > Durkheim’s model is in fact quite problematic.)
> >
> > Finally, and briefly, I think people often feel negatively about
> > atheism, as opposed to just disagreeing with it, because 1) atheists
>
> > can act like real jerks toward religious people; the reverse is also
>
> > true, and probably has a lot to do with anti-religious feelings; or
>
> > 2) they think that atheists have no experience of awe. I’ve
> > actually talked to –very- educated people who said they would not
> > call themselves atheists because they had feelings of awe in face of
>
> > nature -- they are moved to wordlessly by a sunset. I suggested that
>
> > reading more poetry might help them with that; feeling emotional
> > richness or Kantian sublime is not limited to religious people. But
> I
> > think this is where the spiritual-but-not-religious junk comes from;
>
> > people want to find a way to claim their experience of the ineffable.
> >
> > Sorry, I know this is terribly long.
> > MM
> >
> >
> >
> > Melani McAlister
> > Associate Professor of American Studies
> > and International Affairs
> > George Washington Univ.
> > mmc at gwu.edu
> >
> > Mailing address: Office location:
> > 2108 G. St. NW 609 22nd St. NW
> > Washington, DC 20052 Room 203
> > Main office: 202-994-6070 Direct: 994-6073
> > fax: 202-994-8651
> >
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: christopher.w.young at thomson.com
> > Date: Monday, November 20, 2006 7:46 pm
> > Subject: Re: <underfire> Atheism and Peace
> > To: underfire at underfire.eyebeam.org
> >
> >
> >> Mary, Michael and Melani,
> >>
> >> Thank you for sharing your views and opinions of things so
> important to
> >> so many.
> >>
> >> First, can someone define 'absolute value'?
> >>
> >> Second, I am hoping that Melani can offer some thoughts around her
> >> statement "aren't we invited to do -many- things, from fighting
> wars to
> >> cleaning up the environment, "for the sake of our children."
> >>
> >> I am a bit concerned with this statement, as it implies that we
> >> (Evangelicals) are obligated by some theological rule to fight in
> >> wars....hmmm, I do not get a sense this is really the case- if one
> was
> >> to take a biblical standpoint. When I hear such things, it actually
> >> makes me fall back on another representation you made- "that poor people
> >> are being ideologically manipulated by a retrograde state". Although
> >> I
> >> am not articulating that poor people are being ideologically manipulated
> >> by a state, I am arguing that theological texts have been historically
> >> manipulated by the elites, who have changed the inherent meaning of
> the
> >> doctrine to fit their own agenda.
> >>
> >> So, when I see Evangelicals praying in supposedly charismatic tongues
> >> and worshipping a god, who encourages his followers to fight an illegal
> >> war - I am definately taking the position that this group of believers
> >> has been manipulated and perhaps their position in society is not
> >> physically poor, just spiritually sick.
> >>
> >> We are coming to a place in society, where all religions will be
> >> resounded to the same position as atheism - a position where
> meaning is
> >> obsolete and belief in a deity is all but gone from history - an
> >> "McIntyrean" world....
> >>
> >> CY
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> ________________________________
> >>
> >> From: underfire-bounces at underfire.eyebeam.org
> >> [ On Behalf Of Michael H
> >> Goldhaber
> >> Sent: Sunday, November 19, 2006 4:06 PM
> >> To: underfire at underfire.eyebeam.org
> >> Subject: <underfire> Atheism and Peace
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Mary, et al.,
> >>
> >> Mary Keller wrote:
> >>
> >> From this perspective the a-theist is signifying the
> >> significance of their
> >> location in the world. When someone tells me, as you did, that
> >> they are an atheist I hear "I don't need God. I don't count on
> >> transcendentals. I am happy to become worm food. I'm not looking for
> >> wings." From my perspective the atheist and the theist are both
> >> exercising the cognitive desire to map out the significance of their
> >> location in the world.
> >>
> >> Mary, I mistook your original position, it would seem, but here you
> >> mistake mine, and that of many atheists. [FOOTNOTE: Taken
> literally, a
> >> disbelief in god does not necessitate a disbelief in an afterlife (e.g.,
> >> the original Buddhism, in which to be released from the cycle of
> >> reincarnation was a major goal) nor vice versa (Torah Judaism has "G-d"
> >> but no mention of an afterlife; on the holiest day of Yom Kippur, one
> >> prays only "to be inscribed in the book of life for another year,"
> i.e.
> >> not to die within the year.) But ignore these subtleties.]
> >> Atheists believe there is no god. This has nothing to do with what
> they
> >> would like. Further, as an atheist, along with many others, I would
> not
> >> be happy to become worm food, in two ways. First, "I" will not exist
> >> after death (except in the minds of others). My dead body will not
> >> contain not myself; the self will have ceased.
> >>
> >> Second, the prospect of death does not make me happy, but, no matter
> >> what I might want, heaven does not seem to be available as an
> >> alternative. Many atheists wish to avoid death simply by remaining
> >> alive. Some, such as Ray Kurzweil, think that we have reached, or
> >> shortly will reach, a time, when, at least for a fortunate few, life
> >> expectancy increases by more than a year every year, due primarily
> to
> >> medical advances, so living "forever" may become a scientific
> >> possibility.
> >> Thus, for many atheists, life, at least their own, can become an
> >> "ultimate value." Like other ultimate values, if taken alone, this
> can
> >> be dangerous. Some people may ruthlessly harvest others' organs, for
> >> example. However, most recognize that acting to prevent murder and
> >> against violence can be mutually beneficial. Thus, I think it is no
> >> accident that where religion has most waned, in Western Europe, we
> also
> >> find, on the whole, quite little support for war, in comparison
> with the
> >> past.
> >> The commonplace proverb "there are no atheists in a foxhole," can be
> >> taken two ways. The common one, of course, is that being in foxhole
> >> under fire leads to prayer. The other is this: Without religious
> >> feeling, why give up your life, the most precious thing you have?
> >>
> >> The fact is that much of western Europe's long history of war and
> >> conquest was quite explicitly religious: the "reconquista" of the
> >> Iberian peninsula, the various crusades, the eastward expansion of
> the
> >> Teutonic knights, the thirty-years' war, much of the move into Mexico,
> >> Cnetral and South America, the Puritans in New England, the American
> >> Civil War, etc. Perhaps later the religion of "the nation" (the
> >> "Motherland" or the "Fatherland") or the pseudo-religions of Nazism
> >> or
> >> Marxism (both of which imposed belief) to some degree held sway. Now
> >> with social democracy, and no imposed religion, nor imposed atheism,
> >> Western Europeans seem to have become much more peace-loving.
> >>
> >>
> >> Here in the United States, most military recruits and support for the
> >> current war come from areas where religion is also strong - chiefly
> the
> >> South and Midwestern and other rural areas. But, implicitly, even Bush
> >> recognized, for all his rhetoric that "we are at war," that ordinary
> >> Americans are sufficiently atheistic in reality that they do not want
> >> to
> >> make any personal sacrifices whatsoever in this war.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Best,
> >>
> >> Michael
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Under Fire
> >> 16 October - 10 December 2006
> >> International Biennial of Contemporary Art of Seville
> >> all writings copyright individual authors
> >> no commercial use without permission
> >> to post a message, send an email to:
> >> underfire at underfire.eyebeam.org
> >> to unsubscribe, send an email to:underfire-leave at underfire.eyebeam.org
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Under Fire
> > 16 October - 10 December 2006
> > International Biennial of Contemporary Art of Seville
> > all writings copyright individual authors
> > no commercial use without permission
> > to post a message, send an email to:
> > underfire at underfire.eyebeam.org
> > to unsubscribe, send an email to:
> > underfire-leave at underfire.eyebeam.org
> >
>
>
>
> John Arrington Woodward
> Florida State University
> Tallahassee, Florida
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Under Fire
> 16 October - 10 December 2006
> International Biennial of Contemporary Art of Seville
> all writings copyright individual authors
> no commercial use without permission
> to post a message, send an email to:
> underfire at underfire.eyebeam.org
> to unsubscribe, send an email to:underfire-leave at underfire.eyebeam.org
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