<underfire> Weapons as Rhetorical Devices

[Michael H Goldhaber]

The following was originally intended as response in  the dialogue on  
stealth weapons, but it also seems to fit nicely with Nigel Thrift's  
comments, about which I will try to comment further  later.

Weapons and Weapons Technology as Rhetorical Devices

“If a gun is on the table in the first act, it will go off by the  
third act” - Anton Chekhov

In real life, the gun isn’t necessarily ever fired, yet its presence  
is still of great significance, and the same was true for swords and  
spears in the past, and for all manner of weapons now.  Just as the  
gun as theater prop indicated to the knowing theatergoer that some  
play-acted attempt at violence could be expected before the night was  
over, weapons today signify power even when they do not actually “go  
off.” Even when a gun is fired, it may well be as a warning shot. In  
fact, even when weapons are used to kill, most of the time their  
major intended effect is as warning to those not hit. Those warned  
are not necessarily anywhere near the weapon, nor do they have to  
directly witness whatever violence takes place, as long as they learn  
of it in a sufficiently graphic manner.

Depending on the sophistication and credibility of the audience, the  
threat of a weapon can merely be putative. A bank robber need not  
have a gun at all, but just a bearing and perhaps a note stating or  
only implying that he or she does. The kind of weapon does not even  
have to exist, as long as its present or future existence can be  
believably claimed or implied. Thus the “Star Wars” anti-missile  
system favored by President Reagan apparently helped undermine the  
Soviet Union in the 1980’s, even though up to the present, twenty  
years later, it has never been built in sufficient numbers to be any  
threat, and has never even been shown to work with any reliability.  
The point was that with both a nuclear-missile “sword” and the Star  
Wars “shield,” the US would be able to launch an unanswerable and  
undefendable attack on the Soviets. As long as the Soviet leaders  
could not be certain it would not work, and doubted their own ability  
to successfully devote the resources to counter it, it seemed to  
place them in peril. Of course, the Soviet system faced many other  
problems, which the Star Wars threat at most exacerbated. Still, it  
was a long-standing American policy — starting no later than the  
1950’s — to attempt to bankrupt the USSR in a “qualitative” arms race.

Star Wars was only one of the many weapons of the qualitative arms  
race. In order to make the race as dramatic as possible, and thus as  
threatening, every conceivable technology had to be examined, and  
many then became irresistable to put into practice to some degree,  
whether that entailed talking about building them, actually doing so,  
or somehow brandishing or using them. For many reasons, even after  
the fall of the Soviet Union, when there has been no country racing  
the US to any degree, the emphasis on new weapons continued. Some  
reasons: bureaucratic inertia; the desire of weapons companies for  
lucrative new contracts; the assumed need to prop up the American  
economy with defense spending that does not compete with any  
profitable, private-sector offerings; and the self-promotion of  
defense technologists. Another reason to rely on technology was the  
hope that by so doing, the military could appear forceful without  
actually jeopardizing many soldiers’ lives. In the case of Kosovo,  
this actually worked; relying strictly on high-tech air power and a  
little diplomacy, the US pretty much achieved its war aims against  
Serbia without losing a soldier. However, to what extent the high- 
tech advantage was really necessary is not clear; it was a bombing  
campaign against a small, totally out-gunned country, and with  
limited objectives.

A quick, successful battle builds support at home as well. Another  
rhetorical thrust is to the home front, as illustrated by the  
televised beginnings of the Iraq war in “shock and awe.” An even  
better example in my view was the “amazing victory” over the tiny  
country of Grenada in 1983. Still smarting over the defeat in Vietnam  
eight years earlier, US “patriots” proclaimed this victory as a sign  
that “America is back.” The New York City Central Park Police were  
probably up to the task, but the country celebrated as if it had been  
a victory over China.

But there is a problem. Though the US outguns everyone many times  
over, at least on paper, the fact that our weapons are vastly  
expensive and highly sophisticated doesn’t mean they necessarily can  
be used to defeat an enemy without cost. Their rhetorical power may  
not be evident to those who in effect do not speak the language.  
Handing a note reading, “I have a gun,” to a banker who does not read  
English and has never heard of guns would not be an effective way to  
rob her. In the same way, stealth aircraft are no particular  
advantage against foes who do not even have radar, but they are more  
costly to use than conventional planes.

As I have hinted, the Pentagon desperately wants to avoid casualties,  
especially when fighting wars of only marginal value for the survival  
of the US. Under these circumstances, a draft is unacceptable; loss  
of life is unacceptable for most possible volunteers, and for their  
parents. Unless machines can replace soldiers, the Pentagon itself is  
just another “pitiful, helpless giant,” in the immortal words of  
Richard Nixon. Without the capacity to fight actual wars, the  
credibility of the advanced weapons will disappear, and eventually,  
the public will pull the plug entirely, or so they should reasonably  
fear. Thus the need to invent or discover enemies who will fall prey  
to the rhetoric of high-tech weapons at little or no cost in soldiers.

There are not many Grenadas, however. Nor even Kosovos. Finding an  
enemy that justifies vast military expenditures — that is, one which  
is not so much of a pushover that an unarmed bank robber could do the  
job — is not easy. That this enemy must also be perfectly attuned to  
the rhetoric of high-tech and will fold accordingly is even more of a  
challenge. Iraq has proved itself unsuited to its intended role. They  
just don’t get it. All the super-expensive weapons in the world can’t  
work, in that case.  (Aside: It does seem that these weapons, or some  
of them, still overly impress a few, including some in this dialogue.  
One should not fall too easily for the rhetoric. )

In 1964, General Curtis LeMay, head of the nuclearized Strategic Air  
Command, supposedly advocated “bombing them [the North Vietnamese]  
back to the stone age.” In outline, this what the Allies did to win  
over the Axis in WWII., dreadfully bombing some cites in large  
measure as an example to the others.  Then it had worked. Occupation  
after the utter defeat of the Axis armies involved much less  
resistance than either in Vietnam or Iraq. Germany, Italy and Japan  
each became or reinstated democracies of a sort.

One reason LeMay’s Indochina plan got no traction was that the  
Soviets were allies of Vietnam, and they were thought to have plenty  
of nuclear-tipped missiles that could hit the US. A similar strategy  
has undoubtedly occurred to some militarists in the case of Iraq,  
which, in fact, has no nuclear-armed allies that could be counted on  
to attack the US in reprisal.  But even the Bush administration seems  
to realize that world- and even American opinion would be sharply  
against such a brutal and catastrophic attack. The US could never  
live it down.  This is largely because of other technology— satellite  
television, the Internet, color photography. These are all now  
relatively cheap, but they are more effective than all the stealth  
planes or satellite surveillance in the world. Their rhetoric turns  
out to be far more universal, far more comprehensible, and thus far  
more powerful.




Best,
Michael

On Dec 4, 2006, at 4:05 AM, Thrift, Nigel wrote:

> Political Sensations

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